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A decade after the State Street decision, more than 1,000 business method patents are 
granted each year. Yet only one in ten is obtained by a financial institution. Most 
business method patents are also software patents.  
Have these patents increased innovation in financial services? To address this question 
we construct new indicators of R&D intensity based on the occupational composition of 
financial industries. The financial sector appears more research intensive than official 
statistics would suggest, but less than the private economy taken as a whole. There is 
considerable variation across industries but little apparent trend. There does not appear to 
be an obvious effect from business method patents on the sector’s research intensity.  
Looking ahead, three factors suggest the patent system may affect financial services as it 
has electronics: (1) the sector’s heavy reliance on information technology; (2) the 
importance of standard setting; and (3) the strong network effects exhibited in many areas 
of finance. Even today litigation is not uncommon; we sketch a number of significant 
examples affecting financial exchanges and consumer payments. 
The legal environment is changing quickly. We review a number of important federal 
court decisions that will affect how business method patents are obtained and enforced. 
We also review a number of proposals under consideration in the U.S. Congress.  
 
JEL Codes:  O31, O34, G20 
Keywords:  Business method patents, financial innovation, payment systems, financial 
exchanges, KSR International v. Teleflex, eBay v. MercExchange, in re 
Seagate, in re Bilski  
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1. Introduction 
A decade has passed since American courts made clear that methods of doing business 
could be patented. Since then, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has 
granted more than 12,000 of these patents; only a small share of those were obtained by 
financial firms. Some firms, typically those outside the industry, have aggressively 
asserted their patents and have had some notable successes in obtaining licensing 
revenues. Even central banks have been sued (see Table 1). We review a number of 
important instances of such litigation, focusing on the examples of financial exchanges 
and consumer payments. 
If this had been a policy experiment, could we determine today that it was 
successful? Probably not. Measuring the effects of business method patents on the rate of 
innovation or innovation inputs is not a simple exercise. We construct measures of 
research intensity based on the occupational composition of the industry workforce. 
According to these measures, financial services is more R&D intensive than official 
statistics suggest, but still lags private industry as a whole. There is considerable variation 
across industries—financial exchanges and the central bank are more research intensive 
than credit intermediaries (e.g., banks and thrifts). But there has been no significant 
change in the R&D intensity of financial industries.   
In the long run will the patent system function for financial services the way it has 
for pharmaceuticals and chemicals (quite well) or more like it has for information and 
communications technology (ICT)? There are a number of reasons to suspect the more 
relevant analogy is the one of ICT. First, the financial sector is dependent on ICT for a 
large share of its inputs. The majority of its R&D is spent on software development and 
the majority of its R&D workers are programmers and software engineers. Using the 
definition of Bessen and Hunt (2007), four out of five business method patents are also 
software patents.  
Second, like electronics, a number of financial industries rely heavily on standard 
setting arrangements. This is particularly true of payment networks and the financial 
exchanges. For the ICT industries, the intersection of standard setting and intellectual 
property has proven both complicated and litigation prone (Hunt et al. 2007).  
Third, many areas of finance exhibit strong network effects. On the one hand, 
these may act as important complementary assets, making patents less important. On the 
other hand, financial networks may be especially vulnerable to hold-up problems. In 
addition the presence of network effects may complicate the task of calculating 
reasonable royalties, especially in areas where the innovation is cumulative in nature. 
At present, the U.S. patent system is in a state of flux, thanks to developments in 
the federal courts and in Congress. We will examine these in some detail, since a number 
of them could mitigate some of the concerns raised about business method patents: that 
the claimed inventions are not new, are not sufficiently novel to justify awarding a patent, 
and are being enforced in ways that increase business risk to financial firms. But 
significant challenges remain. In particular, the boundaries of the rights being granted in 
some business method patents are not sufficiently clear. Ambiguity over these boundaries 
creates uncertainty for both the owners of these patents and their competitors.    
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews how 
business methods became patentable in the U.S. and the subsequent trends in patenting 
behavior. Section 3 explores the question of whether we should think differently about 
the innovation process and intellectual property in financial services than we do for 
sectors like manufacturing. Section 4 explores the official measurement of R&D in the 
financial sector, measurement issues with those data, and an alternative measure based on 
the occupational composition of financial firms. Section 5 describes some of the patterns 
in litigation and licensing settlements affecting the financial services. Section 6 reviews a 
number of important recent federal court decisions likely to affect business method 
patents. Section 7 examines some relevant aspects of the legislative proposals in the U.S. 
House and Senate. Section 8 concludes. 
2. The Patentability of Computer-Implemented Business Methods 
A patent is a grant of the legal right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
patented invention for a limited period of time. If the patent is infringed, the patent owner 
may sue the infringer to recover lost profits. Sometimes the patent owner is able to obtain 
an injunction — a court order that prevents the alleged infringer from continuing to 
make, use, or sell the patented invention. For reasons described below, an injunction is a 
very powerful legal weapon in patent litigation, perhaps especially so in the context of 
financial services. 
  Of course not all inventions qualify for patent protection. The most important 
requirement that must be satisfied is nonobviousness, or the inventive step, as it is called 
in Europe (Hunt 2004). This requirement precludes patent protection for an invention that 
would have been obvious to a practitioner in the relevant field at the time it was made. In 
other words, a patentable invention must be more than a trivial extension of what is 
already known (the prior art). 
As an example, consider one of the patents examined in the Supreme Court 
decision in Graham v. Deere.
1 The claimed invention was a combined sprayer and cap 
used on bottles of household chemicals. The essential elements of the sprayer had been 
developed by others, but they had never been assembled in this particular way, which 
made possible the use of automated bottling equipment. As a result, the product was 
highly successful. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that long-felt need and 
commercial success might suggest the invention was nonobvious, in the end it decided 
otherwise because the differences between the product’s design and that of pre-existing 
products were minimal. We will return to the problem of evaluating the obviousness of 
combination inventions in section 6.   
A. Patentable Subject Matter  
In the U.S., assuming the other patentability requirements are satisfied (e.g., novelty and 
utility), any process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
improvement of those things can be patented. But the courts have also identified certain 
                                                 
1 383 U.S. 101 (1966). The Supreme Court wrote a combined decision for three patent cases. The patent 
described here was at issue in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., 336 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1964).  
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categories of subject matter that cannot be patented, for example, laws of nature and 
abstract ideas.   
For at least 80 years, it was commonly believed that these limitations precluded 
patenting methods of doing business. This view was suddenly upended by the Federal 
Circuit’s decisions in State Street v. Signature Financial Group and AT&T v. Excel 
Communications in 1998 and 1999.
2 State Street involved a patent on a data processing 
system that made possible the pooling of assets in several mutual funds into a single 
portfolio, reducing overhead costs while maintaining the transaction information 
necessary for allocating gains, losses, and tax liabilities to the original funds. The district 
court determined that the invention in question was a business method and was therefore 
unpatentable. But the Federal Circuit concluded that, under U.S. law, there was no such 
thing as a subject matter exception for business methods. 
An important antecedent to the business method decisions was the more gradual 
change in views about the patentability of computer programs, since the inventions 
described in most business method patents are implemented via computer. This evolution 
spanned the years from the 1972 Supreme Court decision Gottschalk v. Benson to the 
1994 Federal Circuit decision in re Alappat (Hunt 2001, Bessen and Hunt 2007).
3    
B. The Effect of State Street on Business Method Patenting 
Before examining the actual trends in patenting, we must first define terms. In this paper, 
we present data on the volume of business method patents granted. While this includes 
some financial patents, not all business method patents are financial patents and not all 
financial patents are categorized as a business method (see below).  
We focus on counts of business methods for two reasons. The first is clarity, since we 
rely on the definition established by the U.S. patent office in its classification system.
4 
Second, an examination of litigation activity reveals that financial patents are not the only 
patents that create opportunities or risks to financial firms.   
To be explicit, Figures 1 and 2 present data on patents or applications that fall into Class 
705, “Data Processing: Financial, Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price 
Determination,” a relatively new class created in 1997. It refers to patents in this class as 
“computer-implemented business methods,” although one can find examples of 
inventions in this class that do not require the use of a computer.  
The USPTO describes the class as a collection of financial and management data 
processing areas, including insurance, trading of financial instruments, health-care 
                                                 
2 See 149 F.3d 1368 and 172 F.3d 1352, respectively. Since 1982, patent cases are appealed from federal 
district courts to the Federal Circuit and, from there, to the Supreme Court. For a critical examination of the 
State Street decision, see Menell (2006). 
3 409 U.S. 63 and 33 F.3d 1526, respectively. 
4 See Hall et al. 2008, Lerner 2008, and Wagner 2008 for their approaches to defining and counting 
financial patents. While their counts differ from the ones depicted here, in many ways they are qualitatively 
the same. For example, regardless of the definitions employed, the financial sector has not been a very 
important source of business method or financial patents.  
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management, reservation systems, computerized postage metering, electronic shopping, 
auction systems, and business cryptography.
5 Some examples of these patents are found 
in Table 2 and others in Hunt (2001). 
The State Street decision had an almost immediate effect in terms of business 
method patenting behavior. About 1,000 issued patents were classified in Class 705 in the 
first five years after that case; grants are currently running at twice this rate (Figure 1).  
Between 1997 and 1999, new applications for business method patents in the U.S. 
tripled, and they have more than tripled since then (Figure 2). Today, about 11,000 new 
applications for patents on business methods are filed each year, which suggests that 
there will be significant future growth in the number of patents granted. Over 40,000 of 
pending applications for business method patents have been published. A number of 
studies document a similar, but less dramatic rise in applications for business method 
patents in Europe (Hall et al. 2008, Komulainen 2007, and Wagner 2008). Many of those 
applications are related to business method patents already granted in the U.S. 
An inspection of random business method patents reveals that many are not 
directly related to the financial industry (there are many patents on postage-metering 
systems, for example). Nevertheless, half or more of all the patents depicted in Figure 1 
fall into categories of technology directly related to the provision of financial services. 
These are what we call “soft” business method patents. In addition, the vast majority of 
business method patents (roughly four in five) would also qualify as software patents.
6 
One of the interesting developments is the proliferation of patents on tax 
avoidance strategies (Herman 2007, Aprill 2006). In the past, these had often been 
protected as trade secrets, but new regulations substantially reduced the efficacy of this 
form of protection (Squires and Biemer 2006). At least 60 tax shelter patents have been 
issued since the early 1990s, and another 86 pending applications have been published 
(Coggins 2007). There is at least one ongoing infringement suit involving a tax shelter 
patent.
7    
Classifying the industrial mix of the owners of business method patents can be 
difficult. Nevertheless, it is clear that when compared with firms in the information, 
communication, and technology sector (for example, computers, software, and 
communications equipment), financial institutions are relatively minor players. Very 
roughly speaking, manufacturers of electronics, computers, instruments, and software 
account for at least a third, and likely more, of business method patents granted in the last 
five years.
8 It is likely that, after additional analysis of the lesser known assignees in this 
class, ICT firms account for a majority of business method patents. 
In contrast, and again speaking very roughly, financial firms and providers of 
consumer payment services account for less than one-tenth of the total. Still, a number of 
                                                 
5 For additional details, see http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/class705.htm and USPTO (2000). 
6 See the data appendix for the definitions of “soft” business methods and software patents.  
7 For examples of these patents, see Joint Committee on Taxation (2006). 
8 The leading recipients include IBM, Sony, Hewlett-Packard, Fujitsu, Hitachi, NCR, and Microsoft.   
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financial institutions have accumulated a dozen or more of these patents and a significant 
number of pending applications.
9  
C. Why the Lull in Business Method Patenting in 2000-04? 
Two factors may explain the deceleration in business method patenting observed in 
Figure 1. The first factor is the procedural reforms instituted by the patent office in 2001. 
As part of this process, applications falling into Class 705 were examined by a second 
experienced examiner—the so-called “second pair of eyes.” This significantly lengthened 
the pendency period for these applications and may have reduced the allowance rate. In 
2007, the average time between first and a final action on a business method patent 
application was 54 months. This compares to an average pendency of 31 months for 
patents as a whole in 2006.
10 In 2001, 45 percent of patent applications in Class 705 were 
granted. The allowance rate for business method patent applications fell to a low of 11 
percent in 2005 and then recovered slightly to 19 percent in 2006 (Coggins 2007).  The 
overall allowance rate for patent applications in 2006 was 54 percent (USPTO 2007).    
Another factor is that, for a time, the patent office attempted to impose an 
additional requirement for patents on business methods—that the claimed invention must 
fall into the "technological arts." In principle, this meant that a system (e.g., a computer) 
implementing a business method was likely patentable, while the method itself might not 
be (Squires and Biemer 2006). Such a standard has the flavor of the “technical effect” 
requirement for patentable inventions under the European Patent Convention, but it 
would seem to conflict with the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in the AT&T decision. The 
October 2005 decision ex parte Lundgren rejected a separate technological arts test.
11 
This led the patent office to issue proposed guidelines on subject matter patentability that 
explicitly instruct examiners not to use a “technological arts” test when assessing subject 
matter patentability (USPTO 2005).  
D. Acclimation to Business Method Patenting 
The patent office has slowly been developing staff with qualifications to examine 
financial patents. This is not easy, since, in addition to any familiarity with financial 
services, examiners are required to have advanced training in other technical fields. In 
mid 2007, the patent office had 68 examiners dedicated to reviewing applications for 
financial patents. Of these, 32 have either an MBA or a master’s degree in finance or 
                                                 
9 Among others, these include American Express, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Capital One, and Goldman 
Sachs. Scott and Schreiner (2007) report the following counts: American Express (65), Visa (45), 
MasterCard (33), First Data (24), Schwab (23), and Capital One (20). American Express has 150 published 
applications pending; Capital One has 45. 
10 It is interesting to compare this pendency to the rate for two other categories of applications noted for 
long delays: computers and software, 42 months, and communications, 44 months (USPTO 2007). 
11 See Appeal No. 2003-2088 (BPAI 2005). This was a 3-2 decision. The case involved an application for a 
patent, filed in 1993, on a method for compensating company managers to reduce collusion in oligopolistic 
industries. An economist might regard this as an application for a patent on a solution to an optimal 
contracting problem.  
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economics. This is likely the bare minimum level of training required for a person to be 
able to evaluate an application for a patent on a new financial instrument. The USPTO 
hoped to have 100 examiners in these sections by the end of the 2007 fiscal year 
(Coggins 2007). The patent office had a total of about 4,800 examiners at the end of the 
2006 fiscal year.  
Even financial regulators are becoming aware of the significance of intellectual 
property issues. In 2004 the federal agencies responsible for oversight of banks, thrifts, 
and credit unions published guidance on the topic of “Risk Management of Free and 
Open Source Software,” which, among other things, included a discussion of strategies 
for minimizing the potential for inadvertent infringement of patents that might result from 
using an open source program that includes proprietary code (FFIEC 2004).  
3. Are Financial Services Different? 
An important question to ask is whether there are characteristics of the financial sector 
that might make us think differently about how intellectual property influences decisions 
and outcomes among financial firms. For example, how do these firms protect their 
innovations in the absence of patents? Are there special interactions between network 
effects, which are important in many areas of finance and intellectual property? What 
challenges does intellectual property pose for standard setting, which is essential for 
coordinating the interactions of hundreds, if not thousands, of financial institutions acting 
on behalf of millions of clients? 
A. How Do Firms Protect Their Innovations? 
Before we focus on the financial sector, it is useful to review what we know about the 
efficacy of patents in protecting the rents associated with the creation of new products 
and services. In the theoretical literature, it is commonly assumed that, in the absence of 
patents, imitation costs are quite low. Thus, in the absence of the temporary monopoly 
afforded by a patent, an inventor (the first mover) would not be able to recover her R&D 
costs.  
In practice, however, firms employ other means of protecting their innovations. 
Surveys of manufacturing companies in the 1980s and 1990s report that only a few 
industries (chemicals and pharmaceuticals) view patents as the primary means of 
protecting the profits generated by an invention (Mansfield 1986, and Levin et al. 1987, 
Cohen et al. 2000). Other factors, such as lead time or proprietary knowledge maintained 
as a trade secret, were typically ranked as more important than patents.  
In addition, according to this research, firms in most industries viewed their 
investments in specific manufacturing capabilities, reputation, brand names, and 
distribution networks as more important mechanisms than patents for protecting their 
innovations. Such investments are sometimes described as complementary assets. 
Consider the example of the semiconductor firm Intel. While the firm invests heavily in 
patents, much of Intel’s success is derived from its ability to design and build new 
factories (which produce only the latest CPU chips) more rapidly than its competitors.   
B. Network Effects and Standard Setting in Financial Services  
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Financial markets often exhibit network effects: Users find that the services provided are 
more valuable when there are many other users of the service. One obvious example is a 
financial exchange, where efficiency is often determined by the number of active buyers 
and sellers of a security.
12 This creates a tendency to concentrate trading of an instrument 
on just a few (or even one) exchanges. Networks are difficult to start, but once they attain 
a critical mass, they often enjoy a large market share and generate considerable income.   
Network effects also arise from the requirements of interoperability, which is 
extremely important in financial services. Interoperability is accomplished via standard 
setting, where industry participants agree on technical features so that their systems can 
work together. Two examples are the specification of the layout and numbering systems 
of paper checks and the message formats used by automated clearinghouse (ACH) 
networks for direct deposit of paychecks and other transactions. 
   Economic analysis of the interaction between network effects and intellectual 
property rights is a relatively new field.
13 Much more work, both theoretical and 
empirical, remains to be done. But there are at least two important implications to 
consider. First, network effects are an example of complementary assets that may permit 
financial institutions (or networks) to protect their innovations even in the absence of 
strong intellectual property rights.  
Second, a network can be vulnerable to hold-up by third parties who own patents 
allegedly infringed by members of the network. In this context, a hold-up means a patent 
owner could obtain an injunction, effectively shutting down the network. This puts the 
patent owner in a very strong bargaining position, so strong that he or she may be able to 
obtain licensing income in excess of the incremental value created by the underlying 
invention (Shapiro 2006a). An important source of that additional income would be the 
value of the existing network externalities enjoyed by the network 
Consider the case of Research in Motion (RIM), the developer of the BlackBerry 
device and the builder of the servers and software that make it work. RIM was sued by a 
patent-holding company, NTP, whose primary investment was its portfolio of patents. 
RIM, on the other hand, had invested about $1 billion in property, equipment, and R&D. 
NTP won the case and was eventually granted an injunction that would shut down the 
RIM network in the U.S.
14 This induced RIM to settle the litigation for about $600 
million. Ironically, while NTP was very successful in court, the U.S. patent office, on re-
examination, rejected many of NTP’s patent claims.
15   
A similar problem can arise with standard setting, since firms have limited 
options to make technical changes without sacrificing interoperability. Suppose a third 
party subsequently obtains a patent that is infringed by firms complying with the 
standard. The patent owner may enjoy considerable bargaining power. This is especially 
the case when implementing the standard requires significant up-front investments that 
                                                 
12 Another important example of network effects in finance is a payment card network (Hunt 2003). 
13 For a thorough analysis of many of the relevant issues, see Farrell and Klemperer (2006). 
14 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd, No. 3:01CV767 (E.D. Virginia 2005). 
15 NTP appealed at least one of those decisions.  
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firms will be hesitant to abandon simply to avoid infringing the patent. 
A key concern here is the effect of such risks on dynamic incentives. Companies 
may not be aware of all of the patents that may arise and who owns them, at the time they 
are required to make their investment decisions. The risk of potential hold-up may 
discourage firms from investing in the first place. Such lost investment would be 
particularly costly, since it would otherwise enhance the value of the standard and, in 
turn, reinforce the positive externalities that network effects convey (Hunt et al. 2007). 
Alternatively, such risk may increase the barriers that must be overcome in order for a 
standard to become widely adopted. 
C. The Example of Financial Exchanges and Investment Banks 
Financial exchanges exhibit strong network effects and these are likely to affect the value 
of intellectual property in these markets and how that IP is used. There are a number of 
sources of these network effects. First, as noted earlier, the value of an exchange is 
increasing in market depth or liquidity. The more buyers and sellers there are, the more 
rapid is the process of price discovery and, typically, the smaller is the spread between 
bid and ask prices. In addition, a deeper market is able to absorb large orders without 
generating price changes that work against the interests of the trader (Pagano 1989). 
Harris (2003) describes these as order flow externalities: a participant who offers to trade 
provides a valuable option to trade for other market participants, but he or she is not 
compensated directly for providing this benefit.  
Second, there are increasing returns associated with using a common 
clearinghouse for trades. In addition to amortizing certain fixed costs, the practice of net 
settlement increases the efficiency of clearinghouses that serve more traders.
16 For 
exchanges that rely on a central counterparty, trading in a single, larger market also 
allows participants to better economize on the collateral they must pledge (Moser 1998).  
Finally, there are issues of interoperability in the systems used by network 
participants. This has become even more important as financial exchanges have come to 
increasingly rely upon electronic systems for execution, clearing, and settlement of 
trades. Interoperability is typically achieved via standard setting. This is accomplished 
either by technology vendors or by the exchange itself.  
Financial exchanges have been an important source of new financial instruments, 
particularly in the area of derivatives (Caskey 2003, Harris 2003). Other important 
innovators include investment banks (Silber 1981, Bhattacharya and Nanda 2000, Tufano 
2004), who often act as issuers, brokers, dealers, or specialists in these new instruments.
17 
The exchanges also make significant investments in improvements in trading technology, 
but they are not alone. Over the last 20 years other firms have introduced new automated 
                                                 
16 Settlement refers to the actual conveyance of cash to sellers and securities to buyers. These are typically 
performed by settlement agents, which are very often the clearinghouses. Net settlement refers to the 
practice of adding up each trader’s transactions over a given period (usually a day) and making debits and 
credits on traders’ accounts on the basis of these totals. In contrast, under gross settlement, each transaction 
results in separate debit or credit to the traders’ accounts.   
17 For a detailed set of case studies of financial innovation, see Mason et al. (1995).  
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trading platforms and account for a significant share of trading in some markets 
(McAndrews and Stefanadis 2000). These organizations are sometimes called electronic 
communication networks (ECNs).     
Studies by Silber (1981) and Caskey (2003) present evidence that an established 
contract on one exchange enjoys an advantage in terms of liquidity that is often difficult 
to overcome when a similar contract is introduced on another exchange. Anderson and 
Harris (1986) argue that regulations that delay imitation by rival firms reinforce first 
mover advantages, increasing the rents associated with financial innovations.
18 And 
among investment banks, there is evidence that first mover advantages play an important 
role in generating sustained profits from the introduction of new financial instruments 
(Tufano 1989).   
Thus it appears that, for at least this part of the financial sector, firms protect their 
innovations in ways similar to those observed among manufacturing firms. Historically, 
patents have not been a significant part of the story for these firms, and yet their absence 
has not prevented them from investing in new products (financial instruments) or the 
processes (e.g. trading platforms, pricing algorithms) required to offer them. The question 
is then whether the addition of financial patents to the mix can improve on the existing 
incentives and thus increase the rate of innovation. 
Going forward, there are reasons to think the availability of business method 
patents could have significant effects for financial exchanges. For one, it is possible there 
could be synergistic effects if a firm is able to use intellectual property rights to capture 
the benefits conferred by strong network externalities. For example, if a firm obtains a 
patent on a popular financial instrument, it may be able to extract some of the value 
associated with its liquidity in subsequent licensing negotiations. This is more likely to 
occur if a court finds it difficult to disentangle the incremental contribution of the 
infringed patent from the other attributes (including network effects) that make a 
financial product or service valuable. This is a more general concern for combination 
inventions, which are common in ICT industries (Lemley and Shapiro 2007). 
The policy implications of any synergistic effects will depend on the details of the 
particular cases, but they are likely to be important. For example, it is typical to observe 
damage awards in patent cases assessed in terms of percentage points of the revenues 
associated with the infringing product. But the efficiency and liquidity of financial 
exchanges are often measured in basis points of transaction value. A court-awarded 
royalty two orders of magnitude larger would likely create very large deadweight losses. 
A more sensible royalty might be specified in terms of a few pennies a trade. In markets 
where the annual number of transactions can be counted in millions, or even billions, 
such a royalty would still be quite lucrative. If the average value of a transaction was 
large enough, the associated deadweight loss might be more modest.   
D. Other Financial Industries 
                                                 
18 This intuition is formalized in a number of models of sequential innovation. See, for example, Cadot and 
Lippman (1997) and Chou and Haller (1995).  
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There are other areas of finance, for example, certain areas of insurance, where at least 
some participants believe there is a first mover disadvantage. The argument here is that 
the innovating firm incurs the expense required to develop a new product and to obtain 
the necessary regulatory approvals. If the new product is successful, it is quickly imitated 
by competitors (Cuypers 2004). This is precisely the intuition that motivates why 
governments establish patent systems. In such an environment, the availability of patents 
could lead to more R&D and more innovation. It might also influence which firms 
innovate: the availability of patents may enable entry by new firms that do not own the 
complementary assets enjoyed by established firms.
19 
Consumer payment systems, including debit and credit card networks, also exhibit 
strong network effects and rely extensively on investments in ICT. They are excellent 
examples of systems of technology that have benefited from continuous investment and 
innovation over several decades (Evans and Schmalensee 1999). And yet there are very 
few economic studies of how and why these networks innovate. Nearly all of the existing 
economic literature on payment networks relies on static models to examine a number of 
antitrust issues (Hunt 2003). One exception is Verdier (2006), who presents a model that 
examines how pricing and network effects determine investments in network quality and 
which participants make those investments. The role of patents in this industry has rarely, 
if ever, been studied.   
4. Measuring the Effects of Business Method Patents on Financial Services 
It is always difficult to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between a policy change 
and subsequent economic outcomes. This is especially difficult in this case because there 
are no systematic data on the frequency or magnitude of financial innovation over time.
20 
Ordinarily changes in the number of patents might be used. But in this case it would be 
impossible to disentangle the increase in the rate of innovation from the increase in the 
share of innovations that are protected via patents.     
  Another technique is to attempt to identify the effect of these patents on 
productivity growth among individual firms or the industry as a whole. For a variety of 
reasons, this is an especially difficult exercise in financial services and we leave this 
approach for future research (Moulton 2000). But there is ample evidence that ICT 
investments have contributed to productivity growth in the banking sector (Berger 2002, 
Berger and Mester 2003, Humphrey et al. 2006). Thus one channel through which 
intellectual property has long affected financial firms occurs via its effects on suppliers in 
ICT industries. As noted earlier, ICT firms account for a large share, if not a majority, of 
business method patents granted in the U.S. 
In terms of private benefits, Boscaljon, Filbeck, and Smaby (2006) find that, 
among companies in the manufacturing or financial sectors, the announcement of a 
successfully prosecuted business method patent is associated with an increase in the 
firm’s stock price. They do not test for the effect of these announcements on the stock 
                                                 
19 This raises a more general point: To assess the effects of changes in the patent system, we should 
examine the R&D investments of existing firms and changes in patterns of firm entry or exit (Hunt 2007).   
20 For a recent review of empirical studies of financial innovation, see Frame and White (2004)  
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market prices of competing firms. Nor can we determine solely from this analysis why 
the value of these firms increased. Such an increase in value may give financial firms an 
incentive to file for patents, but not necessarily to do more R&D. There are at least 
theoretical grounds for concern about the likely effects on R&D investments of granting 
many marginal patents in highly innovative industries characterized by significant 
technological overlaps among firms (Hunt 2006).  
 A. R&D Investments in the Financial Sector 
If the outputs of financial innovation are difficult to measure, another approach is to 
examine changes in the inputs, specifically research and development (R&D). The first 
items to look at, then, are the measures of R&D spending obtained from the National 
Science Foundation’s (NSF) regular survey of private firms. The NSF has published 
these data for most years since 1958. It began reporting R&D statistics for firms in 
finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) only in 1995 (Figure 3).
21 Its most recent 
estimate (2005) of R&D spending for this group of industries was only $3 billion, 
compared with more than $200 billion for all industries.  
  The NSF generally has not disclosed less aggregated R&D data for this sector of 
the economy. There is one exception, from Jankowski (2001), which reveals the patterns 
among different segments, at least as they existed in the late 1990s (Figure 4). 
Banks/thrifts, securities firms/financial exchanges, and insurance firms collectively had 
roughly equal amounts of R&D spending. The only obvious trend was among securities 
firms and the exchanges where R&D appears to have increased dramatically. A possible 
explanation for the considerable variation over time among real estate/holding companies 
is that this category may include companies established to license intellectual property, 
typically manufacturing technology. As an example, the patent holding companies 
Rambus and Interdigital Communications would be included in FIRE if the industry 
codes assigned to them by Standard & Poor’s (SIC 6794, NAICS 53311) are used 
(Gallaher et al. 2005). 
The NSF reports that the majority (58 percent) of R&D spending in FIRE in 2003 
was for computer software.
22 The financial sector’s focus on software R&D is consistent 
with the mix of investment goods it purchases. In 1997, for example, companies in FIRE 
bought $30 billion in computers and software, making it the largest business customer of 
the ICT sector (accounting for 19 percent of sales). More than three-quarters of financial-
sector investment, excluding structures, was devoted to ICT (Meade et al. 2003). And as 
we will show in the next section, the software focus is also consistent with the mix of 
workers’ occupations that are most likely to be involved in the development of new 
products or processes. 
It is common to evaluate the research intensity of firms or industries by 
comparing their R&D spending to some measure of their size, such as sales or 
employment. According to the NSF data, as a sector, FIRE is significantly less R&D 
                                                 
21 The obvious peak in 2000 may be due to the very significant efforts of financial institutions to modify 
their legacy programs to address the century date change problem. It might also be associated with the peak 
of activity in the dot-com era. 
22 Young (1996) reports that the software share of R&D in financial industries in Canada was 84 percent.  
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intensive than private industry as a whole (Figure 5). By these measures, the private 
economy enjoys research intensity more than five times that of FIRE. And while the 
R&D intensity of the U.S. economy has risen gradually over time, there has been no 
apparent change in the R&D intensity of this sector.   
B. Measurement Issues 
It is quite possible that the NSF’s estimates for the financial sector do not reflect all of the 
R&D activity that is actually occurring. The NSF’s methodology and the definition of 
R&D employed are derived from a long tradition of surveying R&D managers at 
manufacturing firms. In that sector, R&D facilities are relatively easy to identify, and 
members of senior management know who their R&D managers are. In addition, data on 
R&D expenditures can be readily compiled from the existing management information 
systems (MIS) of these firms. All of these factors make it relatively easy to conduct a 
survey of R&D patterns among manufacturing firms.  
But these factors often do not exist among firms in the services sector. For most 
financial institutions, the terms R&D, R&D lab, and R&D manager are largely foreign 
concepts. And in many instances, the internal MIS of these institutions do not contain 
readily accessible data about activities we might describe as R&D.
23 This is evident from 
an examination of the financial statements of publicly held financial institutions. Since 
the early 1970s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required public 
firms to disclose “material” amounts of R&D in their financial statements. And yet, in 
2006 only six publicly traded financial firms reported doing or paying for any R&D and 
the total amount they reported was only $65 million. No publicly held bank or insurance 
company reported doing any R&D in that year.
24  
At least some scholars, and a number of formal reports, argue that there is a 
fundamental difference in the composition of R&D in manufacturing and services, and 
this has implications for its measurement (Jankowski 2001, Gallaher et al. 2005, National 
Research Council 2005, and OECD 2005). Manufacturing R&D is typically about 
developing improved materials, designs, or processes and such activities are very likely 
to fall under the official definitions of R&D used by statistical agencies in the U.S. and 
abroad. In services, however, improving products or processes often involve purchasing 
components from manufacturing firms, integrating these into a system, and finding the 
most efficient way to manage the system to provide benefits to the customer. It is less 
clear whether these activities would be classified as R&D under the traditional 
definitions. 
Here are some concrete examples of the measurement issues. Several tax-court 
decisions conclude that research carried out by financial firms does not satisfy the IRS’s 
                                                 
23 For an extensive discussion of these and other related issues, see Miles (2007) and chapter 3 of the 
National Research Council’s 2005 report. For empirical evidence from Europe, based on surveys and 
interviews, see Preissi (2000). 
24 These data are from the June 2007 vintage of Standard & Poor’s Compustat.  No bank in that data set 
reported a positive amount of R&D in the last 20 years. A few insurance companies have done so, but not 
since 1995.  
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definition of R&D for the purposes of the federal R&D tax credit. In addition, the 
instructions for the NSF survey of industrial R&D specifically excludes from the 
definition of R&D “other nontechnological activities…and research in the social 
sciences” (NSF 2005).
25 The development of a better credit scoring model or a new 
derivative contract would likely fall outside this definition. 
  C. An Alternative: Measuring the R&D Workforce 
Other data may shed additional light on both the level and the trend in R&D being 
performed in the financial sector. To do that, we compare the composition of the 
workforce in financial services with that of the private economy as a whole. This may be 
a particularly informative measure for financial services, since 80 percent of R&D costs 
in this sector consist of wages and fringe benefits.
26 The strategy is to identify those 
occupations that are most likely to be used for research and to count the number of these 
workers among financial services firms.  
To do that, we rely on the Occupational Employment Statistics produced by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data are based on a survey that encompasses all full-time 
and part-time wage and salary workers in nonfarm industries. It does not cover the self-
employed, owners or partners in unincorporated firms, household workers, or unpaid 
family workers.
27 Importantly, in those data, occupations are assigned based on the work 
performed and the required skills and not necessarily on the worker’s education or 
training.  
In those data, we excluded real estate and holding companies from our definition 
of financial services.
28 We also defined a set of occupations we’ll call research 
occupations. This set includes all types of engineers and computer programmers and all 
scientists (including social scientists) and research managers. It also includes actuaries, 
mathematicians, operations researchers, statisticians, architects, cartographers, and 
surveyors. Physicians, teachers, and technicians in any of the above fields were excluded.  
Of course, not all workers in these occupations and employed by financial firms 
are actually engaged in R&D; in fact, most are probably not. But we expect that this is 
also true of other industries. As long as the ratio of actual R&D workers to our broader 
measure remains constant over time, the broader measure should accurately capture any 
trend.  
Using the OES and our list of research occupations that we identified for 2005, 
                                                 
25 In a table, the NSF instructs respondents to exclude from their R&D measures expenditures in the 
following fields: personnel research, economics, expert systems, consumer and market research, 
management and organizational research, actuarial and demographic research, and R&D in law.   
26 That statistic is derived from NSF data for 2002. The comparable share for all private firms is 53 percent. 
27 The 2005 vintage OES, for example, was based on responses from 874,761 establishments, with a 
response rate of 78 percent (BLS 2007). For additional details see the appendix.  
28 While this means we are omitting bank holding companies, the industry detail in OES does not permit us 
to distinguish these from other (nonfinancial) holding companies, which accounted for three-quarters of 
employment in SIC 671 in 1992.  
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our occupational data identify about 3.2 million potential research workers in all 
industries and about 147,000 in financial services. The occupational composition of those 
workers in the financial sector is quite different from that for all industries. In financial 
services, nearly two-thirds of these workers are computer programmers or software 
engineers (Figure 6), but other engineers are extremely scarce. Actuaries and market and 
operations researchers represent a third of the total. This is particularly important for 
thinking about measurement, since these fields are not included in the NSF measures of 
R&D or R&D workers. For all industries, programmers and software engineers represent 
a sizeable but smaller share of all potential research workers and the difference is made 
up by the large presence of engineers (Figure 6). In total, 85 percent of these workers in 
all industries are in occupations associated with fields included in the NSF survey. 
We can compare our measure of potential research workers to the NSF’s counts 
of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D, what we’ll call NSF R&D workers.
29 In 
2005 NSF identified 1.1 million R&D workers in all industries (the first column of Figure 
7). In other words, for every three workers in the research occupations we identify there 
was an R&D worker in the NSF counts. In financial services, the NSF identified 30,000 
R&D workers, about a fifth of the number of potential research workers in our data (the 
second column in Figure 7).    
The NSF count of R&D workers in the financial sector is likely to understate the 
actual number. As described in the previous section, this may result from the definition of 
R&D used or the greater difficulty in identifying where R&D is performed in financial 
organizations. A very crude estimate of the number of additional R&D workers in finance 
can be constructed using the relationships between our data and the NSF data for all 
industries. This requires a strong assumption: that the ratio of these two counts for all 
industries is an accurate measure of the true ratio in financial services. If this was true in 
2005, there may have been an additional 20,000 R&D workers in financial services (see 
the second column of Figure 7).
30 About half of this amount may be attributable to the 
higher share of nontechnological occupations among workers involved in developing new 
products or processes. 
D. Industry Patterns  
In terms of industries, the OES data were more disaggregated in the years prior to 
adopting the NAICS industry classification system. In 2001, the final year for which the 
data were reported using the older SIC system, insurance companies accounted for nearly 
half (65,000) of all potential research workers in financial industries. Commercial banks 
accounted for a fifth of the total (about 27,000) and securities firms just over 10 percent 
(16,000).  
Just as with R&D spending, we can create a measure of research intensity by 
calculating the share of an industry’s workforce that falls in our list of potential research 
                                                 
29 The NSF measure includes more than scientists and engineers. The instructions for recipients of the 
survey of industrial R&D indicate it should include “all persons engaged in scientific or engineering work 
at a level that requires knowledge of physical or life sciences or engineering or mathematics.” 
30 Details on these calculations are found in the data appendix.  
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occupations. According to this measure, there is considerable variation in the average 
R&D intensity over the 1990s across three-digit SIC industries in the financial sector 
(Figures 8-10). Interestingly, five of the seven insurance industries enjoyed a research 
intensity above the average for the sector as a whole (2.7 percent), as did all of the 
industries related to creating or trading securities and commodities. But this was true of 
only one of the eight credit intermediation industries — the central bank.   
E. Trends in Research Intensity 
Figure 11 plots our occupation-based measure of research intensity for the entire financial 
sector and for all industries.
31 There are several striking patterns. First, the potential 
research share of the financial workforce is about the same as for private industry as a 
whole. Second, after 1999, there is a rising trend for the entire economy. The pattern is 
more mixed in financial services, with increases in some years offset by declines in other 
years.
32 Nor does this conclusion change when examining trends over time in different 
segments of the financial services sector  
Should we conclude that the financial sector is as research intensive as other parts 
of the private economy? Probably not. We know from NSF data that, compared with all 
private industries, financial firms spend significantly less on R&D per research worker.
33 
Adjusting for this difference, it would appear that financial services has a research 
intensity (roughly 1.3 percent) about 40 percent of that found in private industry as a 
whole. Still, this is 2.5 times higher than reported in the NSF statistics.   
What can we conclude? First, the financial sector is likely more research intensive 
than is reflected in the official R&D statistics. Second, there is no clear trend in the 
research intensity of this sector. Third, if financial patenting is having an effect, it is not 
easily discerned in any of the R&D measures presented. Finally, NSF data and our 
occupation-based measures show that ICT-related innovations (especially software) are 
important technologies developed and employed in financial services. 
5. Patent Litigation Affecting Financial Services 
Business method patents are no longer intellectual curiosities. Demand letters are 
regularly sent, and dozens of financial institutions, their technology suppliers, and even 
central banks have been sued (see Table 1 for additional examples). In a number of 
instances, very sizeable licensing fees are being paid.   
Lerner (2008) finds that business method patents are litigated at a rate 27 times 
higher than for patents as a whole. Litigated patents tend to be ones granted to individuals 
                                                 
31 The figure was constructed by linking the old SIC to NAICS, but this can only be done at a higher level 
of industry aggregation. 
32 We should be cautious about interpreting the decline from the level of the late 1990s because it coincides 
with the BLS’s switch to a new occupational taxonomy in 1999. 
33 NSF data for 2003 show that for every dollar of R&D spent per full-time researcher in all industries, 
financial firms spent less than 40 cents. While some of this disparity may be due to the definitional issues 
described earlier, it’s unlikely they explain the entire difference.   
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or small firms. But these owners are often not the plaintiffs in these cases; instead the 
suits tend to be initiated by patent-holding companies. Financial patents acquired by 
foreigners are much less likely to be litigated. The defendants in these suits are typically 
large financial firms or exchanges. 
There are some notable examples of patent litigation and successful licensing 
campaigns that involve plaintiffs from outside the industry. Perhaps the most famous 
example is that of Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, which owns, among other 
things, a portfolio of patents on the technology used by telephone call centers. By one 
estimate, Katz has obtained $750 million in royalties via more than 150 licensing 
agreements (Pomerantz 2005, Ambrogi 2007). Licensees include many large financial 
institutions and their processors, including American Express, Bank of America, Capital 
One, Equifax, First Data Corporation, Merrill Lynch, Nationwide, OppenheimerFunds, 
Prudential Financial, T. Rowe Price, Vanguard Group, Wachovia Corporation, and Wells 
Fargo. 
A. Litigation Involving Financial Exchanges 
There has been a significant amount of patent litigation involving the American futures 
and options exchanges. For example, in 1999, the company Electronic Trading Systems 
sued the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, and the New York 
Mercantile Exchange.
34 The ECN eSpeed, a developer and operator of electronic trading 
systems, was also a defendant but it eventually acquired the patent in dispute and 
continued the case against the exchanges. All three exchanges eventually settled the case. 
Licensing revenues over the life of the patent were about $50 million (Schaafsma 2004, 
Young and Corbett 2005).
35  
In another case, the company Mopex threatened to sue the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), arguing that certain exchange-traded funds offered on the exchange 
infringed its patent on an open-end mutual fund securitization process. In 2000, AMEX 
sued to invalidate the patent. The patent was eventually declared invalid because of prior 
art contained in a 1994 Morgan Stanley SEC filing, slightly more than a year before 
Mopex applied for its patent.
36 
ECNs sometimes sue each other. In 2003 eSpeed sued BrokerTec Global, arguing 
that the latter’s online ordering system for trading U.S. Treasury securities infringed its 
system and method patent for auction-based trading of fixed-income instruments. These 
two firms are the dominant platforms for electronic trading of Treasury securities in the 
secondary market (Mizrach and Neely 2006). A district court rejected eSpeed’s petition 
                                                 
34 Electronic Trading Systems Corp. v. The Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, Civil Action No. 3:99-
CV-1016-M (N.D. Texas). 
35 The patent in question (4,903,201) for an automated futures trading exchange was applied for in 1983 but 
only issued in 1990. It expired in February 2007. The patent was initially assigned to World Energy 
Exchange; later it was acquired by Electronic Trading Systems and finally by eSpeed.   
36 American Stock Exchange, L.L.C. v. Mopex, Inc., No. 00-cv-05943 (S.D. New York 2003). An invention 
does not satisfy patent law’s requirement of novelty if it is described in print a year or more prior to the 
application date of a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  
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for a preliminary injunction in the case. Prior to that hearing, the U.S. government filed a 
statement of interest, arguing that a preliminary injunction might disrupt the secondary 
market for Treasury securities (Kellner 2006). ESpeed’s patent was subsequently 
invalidated because of inequitable conduct in its prosecution of the patent application 
before the patent office.
37  
More recently, the firm Trading Technologies International sued eSpeed for 
allegedly infringing two patents on a graphical user interface for displaying the market 
depth of orders for futures contracts (Young and Corbett 2005). In 2007 a jury awarded 
$3.5 million in damages to Trading Technologies.
38 The company has sued a number of 
other firms, and several have entered into licensing agreements. In 2004 Trading 
Technologies made a public offer to the futures exchanges to license its issued and 
pending patents for a perpetual royalty of 2.5 cents per trade (Acworth and Burns 2005). 
B. Litigation Involving Consumer Payment Technologies 
In the last few years there have been a number of suits alleging infringement of patents 
on prepaid debit cards and credit cards, among others (see Table 1 for examples). But 
perhaps the most important example of patent litigation in this area involves the 
application of new technologies to an old payment instrument: the paper check. Check 
imaging and exchange technologies are especially important in the U.S. at this time. 
Banks are in the process of eliminating the physical transportation of paper checks, which 
is generally required under the traditional law for these financial instruments. The Check 
Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003 (Check 21) permits banks to process check 
transactions without physically presenting the original check to the issuing bank, so long 
as certain standards are satisfied.
39 Financial institutions are currently making very large 
information technology investments in order to take advantage of the efficiencies 
afforded by this reform. 
In January 2006, the company DataTreasury sued 57 banks and other companies 
that participate in the check image clearing process.
40 The company also sued the 
Clearing House Payments Co., which operates a check image exchange network. 
DataTreasury owns at least six patents on processes for creating, processing, and storing 
digital images of paper checks. In earlier years it had sued a number of institutions and 
obtained licensing agreements with firms such as JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, and 
ATM manufacturer NCR Corporation. More recently, the ATM manufacturer Diebold 
struck a licensing agreement with DataTreasury in part to assuage bank customers who 
                                                 
37 See eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec USA, L.L.C. 417 F. Supp. 2d 580 (D. Delaware 2006). The decision was 
upheld by the Federal Circuit in 2007.   
38 Trading Technologies International v. eSpeed, Inc, 1:04−cv−05312 (E.D. Illinois 2007). 
39 Public Law 108-100, 12 U.S.C. 5001. If the issuing bank desires, it may insist on presentment of a 
“substitute” check, an image of the original carrying certain information and satisfying certain standards set 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Substitute checks can be sent electronically and 
then printed. Substitute checks are the legal equivalent of the original check. 
40 DataTreasury Corporation v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-cv-00072 (E.D. Texas).  
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have grown increasingly concerned about their potential liability for patent infringement 
(Bills 2007a).  
But the DataTreasury patents are not without controversy. In December 2006, the 
patent office initially invalidated 43 of 50 claims in one of DataTreasury’s patents in a re-
examination requested by a defendant firm — First Data Corporation — but then 
reversed itself in 2007 (Bills 2007b).
41 First Data argued DataTreasury’s patents were 
anticipated in a standard (ANSI X9.46-1995) published prior to the application date of 
the patent. The patents were upheld because no printed copy of the standard could be 
located in a place that was accessible to the public, which is required to be considered as 
prior art.  
 C. Other Litigation 
Some other recent cases have resulted in spectacular misfires for the plaintiffs. Eon-Net, 
L.P. sued 26 companies, including Flagstar Bancorp, for allegedly infringing its patent 
for extracting data from computer scans of paper documents. In the Flagstar case the 
alleged infringement arose from its use of purchased software in its e-mortgage business, 
but the developer of that software had already licensed the patent in dispute. After a year 
of delay, Eon-Net conceded there was no infringement. The court sanctioned the 
company (under Rule 11 of Federal Civil Procedure) for failing to undertake the 
minimum investigation required before filing suit.
42  
In another case, a federal court sanctioned a law firm for filing a frivolous 
infringement suit against Hypercom, a leading manufacturer of point-of-sale transaction 
terminals. The law firm Verve LLC had obtained nearly $1 million in licensing income 
from settlements resulting from suits filed against at least 10 other companies. But 
Hypercom refused to settle. At trial, the district court concluded that Verve had engaged 
in an abuse of process and malicious prosecution, in part because Verve had failed to 
investigate whether there was evidence of infringement prior to filing suit. The court 
awarded Hypercom $700,000 in damages (Young 2007).
43 Verve’s suit before the 
International Trade Commission was also dismissed on similar grounds.   
6. Recent Developments in the Courts 
The last year or so of federal court decisions may represent a sea change in the 
interpretation and application of patent law in the United States. Many of the new 
precedents will be especially relevant for business method patents; indeed a number of 
them involved such patents.  
                                                 
41 The patent in question was no. 5,910,988, on “a system and method for remote image capture, processing 
and storage.” 
42 The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. See Eon-Net, 
L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., Case No. C05-212 9 (W.D. Washington 2006) 
43 Verve LLC v. Hypercom Corporation, 2006 05-CV-0365 (D. Arizona 2006). The patents involved in 
these cases were owned by a Japanese company, Omron Corp. In a separate settlement, Omron agreed to 
pay $1.5 million to Hypercom.    
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A. Patentable Subject Matter 
It appears that the exact boundaries of patentable subject matter for business methods are 
still being explored, in particular when the claimed invention does not make any 
reference to a machine such as a computer. In a number of recent decisions appealed to 
the Federal Circuit, the USPTO has argued that, in addition to the requirements set out in 
State Street and AT&T, the claimed invention must somehow transform something that is 
either tangible or intangible, such as data or signals (Toupin et al. 2007). This reasoning 
follows from a line of cases in the 1980s and early 1990s evaluating the patentability of 
computer programs (Bessen and Hunt 2007).  
In one of the appeals, in re Comiskey, the application was for a patent on a 
process for implementing mandatory arbitration. While reaffirming its conclusion in State 
Street, the Federal Circuit determined that some of the claims in the application—the 
ones that did not involve using a computer or some other communications device—were 
unpatentable subject matter because they described nothing more than “mental steps.” It 
concluded “…the patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems that depend 
for their operation on human intelligence alone.”
44 The court instructed USPTO to 
determine whether the addition of a computer to implement the mental steps in remaining 
claims was obvious, adding that “the routine addition of modern electronics to an 
otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of obviousness.”     
In another appeal, ex parte Bilski, the claimed invention is a method for hedging 
consumption risk for commodities sold at fixed prices.
45 While the method described in 
the claims could be processed via a machine such as a computer, it was not limited to 
such an implementation. The patent office rejected the claims and the applicant appealed 
to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), which also rejected the claims. 
Among other conclusions, the board found the claimed invention was an abstract idea and 
it was not a process in the meaning of the patent act since it did not transform physical 
subject matter (a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter).
46  
The case was then appealed to the Federal Circuit in 2007. After oral arguments, 
the court decided to re-hear the case en banc (i.e., before all 12 judges of the court) and 
solicited amicus briefs on a number of questions. The court explicitly entertained the 
possibility, however remote, of reversing itself on the patentability of business methods. 
In the end, it declined to establish a comprehensive subject matter exception for business 
methods or for computer programs.
47  
Nevertheless, this decision will have important effects on how financial patents 
are prosecuted and enforced. For example, the court explicitly rejected the “useful, 
concrete, and tangible” result test for subject matter patentability articulated in the State 
                                                 
44 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The application in question was No. 09/461,742. 
45 One example would be a hedge against unexpected increases in demand for electricity induced by 
abnormally hot weather.   
46 Appeal No. 2002-2257 (BPAI 2006). The application in question was No. 08/833,89.  
47 ex parte Bilski, No. 2007-1130 (Fed Cir).   
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Street and in re Alapat decisions. It also rejected a technological arts test, re-affirming the 
decision reached by the patent office in ex parte Lundgren (see section 2C).  
Most important, the Federal Circuit articulated a test for subject matter patentability that 
relies explicitly on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the 1981 decision in Diamond v 
Diehr.
48 Under this test, the court interprets business methods as a form of process 
innovation (i.e., not a product). To be patentable, a process must either be tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus or the process must transform an article into a different 
state or thing. The rationale for such a test is that the use of a specific machine or 
transformation of an article ought to impose meaningful limits on the scope of a patent’s 
claims and thus avoid preempting all potential applications an abstract idea. 
Since the claimed invention in question in Bilski does not refer to a machine, the 
court focused only on the transformation part of the test. The essential question, then, was 
whether a hedging strategy somehow transformed an “article.” The Federal Circuit 
concluded it did not, and elaborated more generally: 
“…transformations or manipulations of...legal obligations or 
relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the 
test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not 
representative of physical objects or substances.” 
It would appear that, after Bilski, patent claims to business methods which are not 
implemented via a machine are less likely to survive a challenge and this may be 
especially true if the claim itself represents a disembodied financial instrument or 
investment strategy.
49   
 However,  Bilski does not mark the end of financial patenting in the United States. 
Most applications for patents on business methods rely on some form of computer 
implementation and would likely qualify under the first part of the test articulated by the 
Federal Circuit. In the future, it is likely that more patent claims will be written to either 
recite a substantive machine implementation or a substantive transformation of something 
more physical.
50 This is not unlike the construction of patent claims for computer 
programs commonly used prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision in re Alapat. 
B. Injunctions 
In eBay vs. MercExchange, the Supreme Court revisited the question of when the 
remedies for patent infringement should include an injunction against the defendant, 
prohibiting further use of the patented invention without the consent of the patent owner. 
In the original district court decision in 2003, eBay’s “Buy it Now” feature was found to 
                                                 
48 450 US 175. 
49 In the two months since this opinion was issued, the BPAI cited Bilski in five separate cases involving a 
rejection of claims for nonpatentable subject matter. It affirmed the examiner’s decision in four of them.  
50 This not an entirely trivial requirement. In Bilski, the court noted that reciting implementation via a 
generic computer, or some incidental physical transformation, would not establish the existence of any 
patentable subject matter, since all relevant applications of the abstract idea could still be claimed. See also 
ex parte Rosario Uceda-Sosa, Appeal No. 2008-1632 (BPAI  2008).  
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infringe two MercExchange patents that allowed shoppers to purchase items without first 
participating in an auction. The court awarded damages but no injunction. When 
MercExchange appealed, the Federal Circuit decided that an injunction was also 
warranted.
51 The Federal Circuit opinion argued that injunctions should be denied in 
patent cases only under exceptional circumstances. 
The Supreme Court reversed this decision, remanding the case to the district court 
to determine the appropriateness of an injunction on the basis of the court’s traditional 
four-factor test: (1) A plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable injury, (2) monetary 
damages are an insufficient remedy for this injury, (3) the balance of hardships favor an 
injunction, and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by an injunction.
52 In 
addition, the court concluded that a district court’s decision to impose an injunction (or 
not) may be reviewed on appeal only on the grounds of an abuse of discretion. In a 
concurring opinion, four of the justices linked the public interest part of its test to 
concerns about the vagueness and suspect validity of some business method patents. On 
retrial, the district court applied the Supreme Court’s test and again concluded that an 
injunction was not warranted.
53 EBay purchased the patents in question in 2008. 
Relative to the Federal Circuit’s position, injunctions will be somewhat harder to 
come by. This does not mean, however, that injunctions are no longer available. In the 15 
months after the eBay decision, there were at least 22 district court decisions that 
awarded a permanent injunction after a finding of patent infringement (Slenkovich 2007).   
C. Nonobviousness and Combination Inventions 
The decision in KSR International v. Teleflex is likely the most important Supreme Court 
opinion on patent cases in more than a decade.
54 While the suit involves a mechanical 
invention (an adjustable gas pedal with an electronic sensor), the real issue at question 
was how a court should determine that an invention is obvious and therefore 
unpatentable.  
Courts traditionally assess obviousness from the perspective of a hypothetical 
person having ordinary skill in the art (the so-called PHOSITA). Especially in recent 
years, this inquiry relies on information contained in the (written) prior art that might 
“suggest” an invention that largely consists of a novel combination of pre-existing 
elements. To avoid the problem of hindsight bias (inventions seem more obvious once we 
know how they work), beginning in 1982 the Federal Circuit placed limitations on how 
the prior art could be interpreted to suggest the invention. Unless a piece of prior art 
actually suggests the combination of ideas from other parts of the prior art, the Federal 
Circuit has tended to assume that a person of ordinary skill would not find the invention 
                                                 
51 At the same time the court invalidated one of the MercExchange patents on obviousness grounds. Shortly 
thereafter, in March 2005, a USPTO reexamination reached a preliminary finding rejecting the other patent 
also for obviousness. That decision is under appeal. 
52 See 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).   
53 No. 2:01cv736 (E.D. Virginia 2007). 
54 See 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).  
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obvious. At the extreme, all the relevant aspects of an invention must be contained in a 
single piece of prior art.  
Critics argue that this approach implicitly reduces the standard of 
nonobviousness, since it presumes that a person of ordinary skill in the art has little 
ability or creativity. Some scholars have argued that the capability of PHOSITA ought to 
be reasonably related to the observed rate of technical progress in the field. If the 
standard is too low, the result is less innovation in those industries that ought to be the 
most innovative (Barton 2001, Hunt 2004, 2007).  
A unanimous Supreme Court seemed to agree with this reasoning, reversing the 
Federal Circuit. The opinion concludes: 
"...In many fields there may be little discussion of obvious 
techniques or combinations, and market demand, rather than scientific 
literature, may often drive design trends. Granting patent protection to 
advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation 
retards progress and may, for patents combining previously known 
elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility...." 
This decision could represent the first substantive tightening of the nonobviousness 
requirement in U.S. patent law in over 20 years.  
KSR will have implications for patents in all fields, but its effects could be 
especially pronounced for business method patents that would not have been issued on 
novelty grounds had the prior art been more accessible to examiners (Lerner 2003). For 
this reason alone, this decision could significantly influence the way financial patents are 
used in the U.S. It may also affect the number of these patents granted by the USPTO.  
Several recent lower court decisions reflect the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
KSR, and a number of patents have been invalidated on obviousness grounds.
55 In one 
case, the Federal Circuit upheld the patent office’s rejection, on re-examination, of two 
patents that claimed a system of inflation-adjusted deposit and loan accounts.
56 The 
rejection was based on two pieces of prior art. The first was a book chapter that described 
how, in the 1950s, Finnish banks would adjust their loan and deposit accounts for the 
actual inflation that had occurred (Mukherjee and Orlans 1975). The second was a patent 
granted in 1983 that described how to use a data processor (e.g., a computer) to manage a 
set of accounts. The combination, then, was deemed to be obvious.  
In a separate case, a district court invalidated a patent on a computerized method 
for securing a loan using future credit card receivables, arguing that the claimed invention 
was a predictable variation of at least five card programs in existence well more than a 
year before the application date. This prior art was not considered by the patent office 
when it decided to grant the patent.
57 
                                                 
55 See, for example, Leapfrog Enterprises v. Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 06-1402 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
56 See in re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., Nos. 06-1599, -1600 (Fed. Cir. 2007). These patents were the 
subject of a 1999 infringement case against Pimco Advisors, L.P., which resulted in a settlement. 
57 See Advanceme Inc v. Rapidpay, LLC, et al., Case No. 6:05 CV 424 (E.D. Texas 2007). On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit concurred with the district court decision.  
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D. Willful Infringement 
The Federal Circuit recently overturned its own precedent regarding the determination of 
willful infringement. This is an important decision because when a firm is found to 
willfully infringe a patent, it is likely that a court will award treble damages to the 
plaintiff.
58  
Nearly 25 years ago, the Federal Circuit articulated its definition of willful 
infringement: when a potential infringer has notice of another’s patent rights, he or she 
has a duty to exercise care to avoid infringing. One way to discharge that duty would be 
to obtain competent legal advice before engaging in activities that might infringe the 
patent.
59 This precedent and subsequent cases created two complexities. The first is that it 
put defendants in the position of disclosing a legal opinion, in order to avoid an allegation 
of willful infringement, but at the risk of implicitly waiving attorney-client privilege. The 
second is that the investigation often becomes one of determining the intent of the 
defendant. 
In an August 2007 decision, in re Seagate Technology, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that its earlier precedent on willfulness was the equivalent of imposing a 
standard of negligence on potential defendants when a standard more akin to recklessness 
would be more appropriate.
60 It reached this conclusion by analogy to precedents 
established in other cases. For example, federal courts will impose enhanced damages in 
copyright infringement cases when the defendant demonstrates reckless disregard for the 
plaintiff’s rights.
61 The Federal Circuit concluded that  
“Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an 
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a 
valid patent …The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to 
the objective inquiry…the patentee must also demonstrate that this 
objectively defined risk was either known or so obvious that it should have 
been known to the accused infringer.” 
It would appear that establishing willful infringement of a patent, with the attendant 
prospect of treble damages, is now more difficult. In addition, the Federal Circuit 
reiterated that it was not necessary for potential infringers to obtain prior advice of 
counsel in order to avoid a charge of willful infringement and that any waiver of attorney 
client privilege did not apply to trial counsel. 
                                                 
58 Under U.S. patent law, a court is permitted to award damages up to three times the actual harm to the 
patent owner. See 35 U.S.C. § 284. But the law itself does not specify the circumstances where such an 
award is appropriate. 
59 See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir.1983).  
60 See Miscellaneous Docket 830 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
61 The opinion also mentions the recent Supreme Court decision in Safeco Insurance Co. v Burr, 127 S. Ct. 
2201 (2007), which involved a case under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Under that law, consumers can 
recover actual damages resulting from negligent violations and punitive damages if the violations were 
found to be willful. In this case, the Supreme Court defined willful as reckless behavior.  
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E. Declaratory Judgments by Patent Licensees 
Does agreeing to licensee of a patent imply forfeiting one’s right to dispute its validity, or 
infringement, in court? This is the question in MedImmune v. Genentech.
62 MedImmune 
licensed Genentech’s Cabilly II patent in 1997, but it also sought a declaratory judgment, 
arguing that it did not infringe any valid claims of the patent in question. In the lower 
courts, Genentech sought dismissal of the case, arguing that MedImmune lacked standing 
to sue, since it was paying royalties and thus did not face a risk of being sued. This 
argument is sometimes called “the reasonable apprehension of suit” test.
63  
This doctrine poses a tradeoff for any firm contemplating a license of a suspect 
patent: On the one hand, the firm may want to protect itself from additional and 
substantial liability if the patent is upheld. On the other hand, it may not want to give up 
the option to seek invalidation of the patent. But ordinarily, it cannot accomplish both. It 
must either seek a license and forgo the opportunity to litigate, or decline a license and 
risk an even larger damage award if it is subsequently found to infringe a valid patent. 
Those damages could be potentially very large if the firm is found to willfully infringe 
the patent (see the preceding section). But in an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court 
overturned the lower court decisions, citing a similar case before the Supreme Court in 
1943.
64       
F. Joint Infringement 
In most patent cases establishing literal infringement of a patent requires a showing that 
the defendant copied every element of a claimed invention (for products) or practices 
every claimed step in the cases of processes or methods. Infringement can also be 
established under the doctrine of equivalents, where an alleged infringer practices the 
claimed invention, but with insubstantial alterations. Still, it must be the case that the 
defendant is practicing the equivalent of all the claimed elements of the patented 
invention.
65 
Suppose that every step of a patented process is used, but not all of them by an 
individual party. When can a plaintiff establish joint infringement of the patent? This 
exact question arose in an infringement suit involving two patents, owned by BMC 
Resources, on methods of processing debit transactions without using a personal 
identification number (PIN) for bill payments.
66 A bill payment service offered by the 
alleged infringer, Paymentech, contained each of the steps in BMC’s patents. However, 
both parties in the case agreed that several of the claimed steps were performed by other 
actors (e.g. the merchant, the bank, and the debit card network), and not Paymentech 
itself.  
                                                 
62 See 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
63 See, for example, the Federal Circuit decision in Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F. 3d 1376 (2004). 
64 Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943). 
65 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).  
66 The patents in question are no. 5,718,298 and 5,870,456.  
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The case was eventually appealed to the Federal Circuit, which decided that a 
necessary condition for establishing joint infringement is the existence of a party 
directing or controlling the actions of the other parties.
67 A classic example, established 
in previous cases, would be contracting out one or more of the claimed steps to be 
performed by a third party. In other words, establishing an explicit agency relationship 
specific to practicing one of the claimed steps would be a clear indication of active 
control by the principal. But such a relationship was not demonstrated in this particular 
case.
68   
7. Legislative Proposals 
For a number of years, there has been considerable debate over the efficacy of the patent 
system in facilitating innovation in high-technology industries that tend to innovate 
cumulatively. Two recent reports, one by the Federal Trade Commission and another by 
the National Academies, have added weight to these concerns (FTC 2003, Merrill et al. 
2004).
69 From this debate there is an emerging consensus in favor of some limited 
reforms. Other proposals are more controversial. 
  After several years of stalemate, the House of Representatives passed its version 
of a patent reform bill (HR 1908) in September 2007. In early 2008, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee reported its version of the legislation (S. 1145). The two bills are similar but 
not identical. The bills contain many provisions, and the ones most relevant to the topic 
of this paper are described briefly here.
70  
A. Publication of Patent Applications 
A 1999 law specified that patent applications, in their original form, would be made 
public 18 months after the date of application. Prior to 1999, pending applications were 
not disclosed by the patent office. But that law included an exception to the publication 
requirement for an applicant who stipulates he or she does not intend to file for a patent 
to protect the same invention in countries that also require that pending applications be 
published.
71 Both bills would remove this exception. Publication of pending applications 
is important because it is often the first notice to market participants that an applicant 
may obtain property rights that could affect their businesses. 
B. Prior User Rights 
                                                 
67 498 F. 3d 1373 (Fed Cir 2007). For a discussion of this case, see Truong (forthcoming). See also Lemley 
et al. (2005). 
68 Paymentech had entered into contracts with several debit card networks, but these were never introduced 
as evidence in the case. See the district court opinion, No. 3-03-CV-1927 (N D Texas, 2006). 
69 See also Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Bessen and Meurer (2008).  
70 The description of legislation presented here is based in part on Thomas and Schacht (2007).   
71 The American Inventors Protection Act,  P.L.106-113, 113 Stat. 1537-44. The particular section 
referenced here is found at 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).  
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The 1999 law also imposed a limitation on the enforcement of business method patents 
against firms that had been practicing what became the patented invention as a trade 
secret for at least a year or more before the date of the patent application.
72 Such prior 
users could not be held liable for infringement, nor would they be required to obtain a 
license from the patent owner in order to continue practicing the invention.  
Traditional trade secret law does not offer such protection and for deliberate 
reasons: it is a way of encouraging individuals and firms to file for patents and thus 
disclose their inventions. 
One of the reform bills would expand the availability of prior user rights for all 
patents and not just for patents on business methods. Although prior user rights do exist 
in some other industrialized countries, this would represent a very significant change in 
U.S. patent law.
73  
C. Calculating Damages for Patent Infringement 
The bills contain a number of provisions that might affect how damages for patent 
infringement are determined. First, the criteria used to determine willful infringement 
would be modified. These proposals have likely been superseded by the recent decision 
in Seagate (see section 6D).    
Second, the bills contain language on how damages should be calculated for 
combination inventions. These are products (or services) that embody many inventions, 
which can complicate the determination of the contribution of a particular patented 
invention to their total value.  
This is a contentious issue in policy circles. On the one hand, in ICT industries 
such as computers, electronics, and software, there are concerns about royalty stacking. 
Products in these fields may embody dozens or even hundreds of patented inventions. 
Some researchers and industry participants suspect that, in such environments, there is a 
tendency for courts to overestimate the marginal contribution of each invention to the 
value of the whole (Lemley and Shapiro 2007).
74 But expected trial outcomes may also 
influence the terms of licensing negotiations. The resulting conflict over the division of 
profits may reduce the incentive to bring new products to market. Others worry that rules 
devised to address a problem in ICT industries may have unintended effects for industries 
such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, where inventions and the resulting products tend 
to be more discrete.  
D. Opposition Procedures 
The bills contain a number of provisions intended to improve the quality of issued patents 
                                                 
72 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b). Currently, a prior user right applies only to a patent on a “method of doing or 
conducting business,” but this phrase is not defined in the act.   
73 See Denicolò and Franzoni (2004), Shapiro (2006b) and Moschini and Yerokhin (2008) for economic 
analyses of prior user rights. 
74 See Thomas (2007) for examples from a number of recent decisions.  
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by increasing the information available to the patent office. That information is likely to 
come from interested third parties. The general idea is to reduce uncertainty over the 
validity of patents before they result in very costly trials. The proposal comes in two 
general forms, depending on whether the intervention occurs before or after a patent is 
granted. These are often called pre-grant or post-grant oppositions.  
In the first instance, third parties would have an opportunity to submit (written) 
prior art to the patent office before it makes a final decision about the application. In most 
instances this would occur after the original application is published (see section 7A).  
Such a process already exists under current law, but it is little used for a number 
of reasons. First, any pre-grant opposition from a third party must occur within two 
months of the publication date of a pending application (Thomas and Schacht 2007), 
which may very well be the first time that a third party becomes aware of an issue 
affecting his or her business. Some of the bills would amend the deadline to permit third-
party submissions before the date the patent is granted or six months after the patent 
application is published, whichever is later. 
 Post-grant opposition procedures are available in some other industrialized 
countries, and the U.S. has enjoyed a limited version (ex parte re-examination 
proceedings) since 1981. Initially the role of third parties was simply to bring prior art not 
considered in the original examination to the attention of the patent office. The role of 
third parties in this process was expanded in 1999. But this inter partes re-examination 
procedure is rarely used, perhaps for strategic reasons: A party using the procedure may 
not use the argument presented, or any other argument it could have raised during the 
proceedings, as a defense in a subsequent patent infringement case.
75 
One of the patent reform bills would establish a new post-grant review proceeding 
that third parties could use within a year after a patent was granted (the so-called first 
window). The other bill would also permit a third party to initiate an opposition 
proceeding when it has received a notice of potential infringement from the patent owner 
(the second window).
76 Third parties who unsuccessfully participate in this process would 
be barred from using the same argument as a defense in subsequent litigation, but they 
would be permitted to use other arguments they could have raised at the time of the 
review proceedings. 
E. Special Relief for Particular Industries 
Two interesting amendments were included in the reform bills reported out of the 
Judiciary committees. The house bill, for example, would make tax planning methods 
unpatentable subject matter.
77 The Senate bill contains an amendment intended to 
preclude patent infringement claims against institutions processing checks in compliance 
with the requirements of Check 21 (Bills 2007c).
78 But the official cost estimate for the 
                                                 
75 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). The purpose of this restriction is to prevent abuse of the opposition process.   
76 For a more detailed discussion of post-grant review procedures, see Hall et al. (2003).   
77 See Section 10 of H.R. 1908, as reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. 
78 See Section 14 of S. 1145, as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.   
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bill suggested the affected patent holders would likely sue the federal government for 
taking private property. Taking into account the likelihood of success, the Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that the expected cost of compensating the patent holders could 
be as high as $1 billion (CBO 2008). It is unlikely this amendment will be retained. 
Other aspects of the reform proposals seek to more closely harmonize U.S. patent 
law with that of other countries (e.g., moving to a first-to-file system, eliminating the best 
mode requirement, and revising grace periods). Another bill introduced in 2007 (HR 34) 
would create a US District Court patent pilot program to provide training to judges and 
law clerks in five federal district courts. Patent cases within these districts could then be 
referred to these judges by other judges who would prefer not to hear patent cases.   
8. Conclusions 
There is at present very little evidence to argue that business method patents have had a 
significant effect on the R&D investments of financial institutions. It is possible that the 
availability of business method patents has encouraged more entry and R&D by start-up 
firms or more efficient trading of technologies. At present, however, these represent 
intriguing possibilities and not outcomes that have actually been measured. In short, we 
still cannot determine whether these patents are creating value for the U.S. economy. 
Nevertheless, business method patents are becoming commonplace. Compared 
with many other patents, they are litigated more often. Some of this litigation has resulted 
in very large settlements paid by established providers of financial services. These facts, 
in themselves, don’t prove anything. But combined with the lack of evidence suggesting 
a positive effect on R&D investments, they do suggest that there is likely scope for 
improving on the current business method patent bargain.  
From the standpoint of policy, it is important to ensure that patents are granted 
only for new and nonobvious business methods and that those standards are rigorous. In 
this light, the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR and the debate over the adoption of 
enhanced opposition procedures appear to be positive developments. The characteristics 
of financial markets — in particular, network effects and the requirements of 
interoperability — should affect the choice of appropriate remedies for patent 
infringement. At least after the eBay decision, these factors may influence when a court is 
willing to grant an injunction or how it will determine the damages resulting from 
infringement. Each of these changes suggests that we may already be in the process of 
increasing the benefits and reducing the costs to society of financial patents.  
Not all concerns about business method patents are likely to be resolved by these 
changes. One major concern about business method patents, and software patents more 
generally, is that their abstractness makes it difficult to determine the actual boundaries of 
the property rights being granted. Using the jargon of patent law, these patents often 
suffer from ambiguous “claims.” Bessen and Meurer (2008) point out that appeals over 
the definition of claims in a business method patent occur more than six times as 
frequently as for (litigated) patents in general. This is problematic because if firms cannot 
determine what is protected and what is not, instances of inadvertent infringement are 
more likely to occur.   
Consider the analogy to property rights to land. If the boundary lines between  
  29
properties are consistently unclear or frequently reinterpreted over time, trespassing on 
another’s property would be more difficult to avoid. Even worse, there may be instances 
in which a person makes significant improvements to his or her property only to find he 
or she has built partially on another’s land. The result would be more litigation, and this 
additional risk might deter efficient investments.  
The combination of significant technological overlap among firms, elastic patent 
boundaries, inadequate enforcement of disclosure requirements, and weak patentability 
standards raises at least the theoretical possibility of perverse outcomes (Hunt 2006). In 
such environments, firms may obtain more patents but perform less R&D, since the fruits 
of such efforts would be subject to an innovation tax imposed by rival firms.  
Data Appendix 
The estimate of business method patents that are more financial in nature is based on counts of patents 
falling into subclasses of Class 705 based on analysis of patents performed by CHI research in 2001. These 
subclasses include 1, 4, 7, 10, 16, 26, 30, 33, 45, 53, and 64-80. These exclude many of the patents 
primarily dealing with cryptography, postage metering, and other technologies less closely related to the 
provision of financial services. 
The definition of software patents used to calculate the software share of business methods is the 
one specified in Bessen and Hunt (2007). It is based on the following search of the USPTO patent full text 
database: “SPEC/software OR SPEC/computer AND program ANDNOT spec/antigen OR antigenic OR 
chromatography ANDNOT ttl/chip OR semiconductor OR bus OR circuit OR circuitry AND ISD/$/$/yyyy 
AND ccl/705/$.” 
The analysis of occupational data is based on the Occupational Employment Statistics compiled 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (see http://www.bls.gov/oes/home.htm). Since 2003 the survey has 
been done twice a year (May and November). All the estimates presented here use the May vintage of the 
data for the years after 2003.  
Over the years, the OES has used three different occupational classifications. The most significant 
change was the adoption of a modified Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system in 2000. We 
constructed a crosswalk between each system relying in part on information at the National Crosswalk 
Service Center.  The OES data were compiled using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system 
industries until 2001 and, thereafter, using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). 
We constructed a crosswalk for these industries relying in part on a tabulation by the BLS.  
In the text, we suggested a potential undercounting of R&D workers in financial services of about 
20,000. This was derived as follows. For all industries in 2005, the ratio of potential research workers to 
R&D workers identified by the NSF was 2.9:1. Dividing the 147,000 potential research workers in 
financial services by 2.9 yields about 50,400 jobs, about 20,200 more than found by NSF. If, however, we 
exclude workers in all industries who were actuaries, operations researchers, market researchers, and social 
scientists, the ratio of potential research workers to NSF R&D workers falls to 2.5:1.  Excluding jobs in 
those occupations in the financial sector leaves about 98,400 potential research workers in 2005. Dividing 
this number by 2.5 yields about 39,400 jobs, about 9,200 more than reported in the NSF data.References 
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Table 1: Additional Examples of Patent Litigation Affecting Financial Services 
Case/Litigants/Filing Date*  Description 
Suits Against Central Banks 
Document Security Systems, Inc. 
v. European Central Bank, Case 
T-295/05 (European Ct. of First 
Instance Aug. 1, 2005). 
DSS sued the ECB for infringing its patent on a method of 
incorporating an anti-counterfeiting feature into bank notes (EP 
0455750B1). The ECB took legal action to invalidate the patent in nine 
countries. The patent was subsequently revoked in the UK and France 
but upheld in Germany and the Netherlands.   
Advanced Software Design Corp. 
v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis., No. 4:07cv00185 CDP 
(E.D. Missouri, November 9, 
2007). 
ASD alleges the defendants (Fiserv and the Federal Reserve Banks of 
Atlanta, Philadelphia, and St. Louis) are infringing three of its patents 
(6,233,340; 6,549,624; & 6,792,110) on anti-counterfeiting software 
that encrypts information from paper checks.    
Suits Involving Payment Card Technologies 
Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Bank 
of America, No. 2:07-cv-42-
FtM-29SPC (M.D. Florida, Jan. 
25, 2007);  
Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. First 
Data Corporation, Inc. No. 8:07-
cv-1245 (M.D. Florida, July 17, 
2007) 
EPC alleges that BoA’s "Keep the Change" savings product violates its 
patent (6,112,191) on a system and method to distribute excess funds 
from consumer transactions.  
In a separate case, EPC has sued First Data, American Express, 
MasterCard, and Visa for infringement of this patent and two others 
(5,621,640 & 6,876,971). 
Card Activation Technologies; 
Barnes & Noble, No. 
1:2007cv01230 (N.D. Illinois, 
Mar. 2, 2007) 
CAT alleges that the defendants are violating its patent (6,032,859) on 
gift card activation and processing. An attempt to invalidate the patent 
on grounds of “indefiniteness” was rejected. CAT has four other suits 
pending against retailers Sears, OfficeMax, Walgreen’s, and TJX 
Companies. It reached a settlement with McDonald’s in 2007. 
H&R Block Tax Services v. 
Jackson Hewitt Tax Service,  No. 
6:2008cv00037 (E.D. Texas Feb. 
8, 2008) 
H&R Block alleges that the defendant is infringing its patents 
(7,072,862 & 7,177,829) on a system and method of linking tax 
refunds and government benefits to a spending card. 
Advanced Card Technologies v. 
UV Color inc., 5:2006cv00957  
(W.D. Oklahoma, Sept.7, 2006) 
ACT alleged that the defendant had infringed two patents (5,720,158 & 
5,921,584) on breakaway plastic card products bearing magnetic 
stripes, such as phone cards and gift cards.  The two firms reached a 




Other Patents Suits Affecting Banking 
LML Patent Corp. v. Telecheck 
Services. et al. Civ. No. 04-858 
SLR (D. Delaware, Mar. 28, 
2006) 
LML Patent Corporation v. JP 
Morgan Chase, et al. No. 
2:2008cv00448 (E.D. Texas, 
November 19, 2008) 
In several suits, LML alleged that the defendants (including Nova 
Information Systems and the Electronic Clearing House) infringed its 
electronic check conversion patents (5,484,988; 6,164,528; & 
6,283,366). This litigation was resolved via settlement agreements in 
2006. It also reached a separate licensing agreement with ACH Direct. 
In November LML sued PayPal and 18 large financial institutions for 
allegedly infringing its patent on a check-writing point-of-sale system 
(RE40,220, a reissue of patent no. 6,547,129). 
TradeCard v. S1 and Bank of 
America, 509 F. Supp. 2d 304 
(S.D. New York, Sept. 6, 2007) 
TradeCard alleged that the defendants infringed its patent (6,151,588) 
on a system for automated processing of letters of credit and purchase. 
At trial the patent was invalidated for obviousness. 
IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 
469 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. 
Delaware, Jan. 10, 2007) 
IMX alleged that the defendant infringed its patent (5,995,947) on a 
method and system for making loan applications and placing them up 
for bid by potential lenders. A jury found there was infringement and 
awarded $5.8 million in damages. Because it also found the 
infringement was willful, the damages were increased 50 percent. 
Debt Resolve, Inc. v. Apollo 
Enterprise Solutions, No. 
1:2007cv04531 (S.D. New York,  
May 30, 2007) 
Debt Resolve alleged that the defendant was infringing two patents 
(6,330,551, & 6,954,741) on a computerized dispute resolution system 
and method  by making automated debt settlement offers to consumers 
in arrears (these patents are co-owned with Cybersettle). The two firms 
reached a settlement that included a stipulation that Apollo had not 
infringed the patent. 
Patent Suits Related to Insurance 
Lincoln National Life Insurance 
Co. v. Transamerica Life 
Insurance Co., No. 
1:2004cv00396 (N.D. Indiana, 
Oct. 21, 2004); 
__ No. 1:2006cv00317 (N.D. 
Indiana, Sept. 14, 2006); 
__ No. 1:2008cv00135 (N.D. 
Ind. filed May 20, 2008). 
Lincoln is involved in several patent suits alleging that Transamerica 
and several other insurance companies are infringing one or more of its 
patents (6,611,815; 7,089,201; & 7,376,608) on a computerized 
method of administering an annuity with minimum payment features. 
Other Patent Suits and Settlements 
Cybersettle v. National 
Arbitration Forum, No. 2007-
1092 (Fed. Cir., July 24, 2007). 
Cybersettle alleged that the NAF infringed its patent (6,330,551) on a 
computerized dispute resolution system and method. It prevailed in the 
district court, but the decision was vacated by the Federal Circuit for 
erroneous claim construction.   
* All citations are subject to the economist’s usual measurement error. Other cases are found in the text.  
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Table 2: A Nonrandom Sample of Business Method Patents Granted in 2008 
Description* Company
# 
A method and system for predicting changes in interest-rate 
sensitivity induced by changes in economic factors that affect 




A method and system for calculating marginal cost curves for 
electricity generating plants (no. 7,333,861). 
NeuCo, Inc. 
A method of selecting sector weights and particular securities 
for a stock portfolio (no. 7,340,425). 
First Trust Portfolios 
A system and method of calculating prepayment and default 
risk, loss given default, and default correlations for the purpose 
of valuing a portfolio of assets (no. 7,340,431). 
Freddie Mac 
A machine and computer program that enables the pricing of 
auto insurance based on the risk associated with driving at 
particular locations and times (no. 7,343,309). 
International Business 
Machines Corp. 
A system and method for trading pollution emission allowances 
(no. 7,343,341). 
Chicago Climate Exchange, 
Inc. 
A computer-implemented method of computing price 
elasticities, choosing from one or more demand models based 
on goodness of fit (no. 7,343,355) 
i2 Technologies US, Inc. 
A method of assessing the capital adequacy of an automotive 
finance company (no. 7,346,566). 
Ford Motor Company 
A method of creating a customized payment card, based on a 
consumer's instructions/images, via a website (no. 7,360,692). 
AT&T Delaware Intellectual 
Property, Inc. 
A method of sharing the profits generated by a payment card 
program, in excess of some target, with users of the card (no. 
7,360,693). 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A 
* The author’s interpretation, based on the patent’s claims or description of the invention 
# Initial assignee on the patent document 
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Class 705
Soft Business methods*
Source: U.S. Patent & Trademark Office & author's calculations
           e: The 2008 total is estimated from 5 months of data
           *: patents in subclasses 1, 4, 7, 10, 16, 26, 30, 33, 45, 53, and 64-80 of Class 705. See appendix for details.
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Figure 6: Composition of "Potential Research Workers," 2005
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Source: Author's calculations using data from Bureau of Labor Statistics and National Science Foundation
     *:  See the text for the definition of potential research workers. Note these include workers in "non-technological" occupations, which are 
associated with fields that are not included in the NSF measures of R&D expenditures: actuaries, market and operations researchers, and social 
scientists. Estimates of additional financial R&D workers assume the true ratio of NSF R&D workers to potential research workers in financial 
services is identical to the ratio for all private industries (34%). About half of this amount may result from undercounting R&D workers who are in 
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